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INDIGENT ACCESS TO EMERGENCY CARE: THE POOR
BLEED RED, BUT THE HOSPITALS WANT GREEN
I. INTRODUCTION

The sudden and urgent need to acquire emergency medical care
is a painful and traumatic experience. For an increasingly large segment
of the population in the United States, however, the physical pain and
mental anguish of a medical emergency may be transcended by the fear
that access to care will be denied or limited for economic reasons.' For
example, a man with a knife wedged against his spine was transferred
from an emergency room because he did not have insurance or a onethousand dollar cash advance. 2 Similarly, a mother seeking emergency
care for her infant suffering from spinal meningitis was turned away from
the hospital because she lacked insurance or the fifty-four dollar
emergency room fee.3 Also, when neurosurgeons in a private hospital
refused to attend to an indigent man suffering from serious head injuries
the patient lapsed into a coma prior to transfer to a public facility and died
without regaining consciousness. 4 Commonly referred to as patient
dumping, the denial of medical service to a patient5 or the transfer of
patients from one hospital capable of providing care to another for
economic reasons 6 is a social and legal problem that confronts our society
today.
The patient dumping problem is the product of a unique
combination of past and present day factors. 7 In retrospect, it is clear
1. See generally Note, Preventing PatientDumping:Sharpeningthe Cobra'sFangs,
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1187 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Cobra'sFangs].
2. Id. at 1186 (citing Annas, Your Money or Your Life: "Dumping" Uninsured
Patientsfrom Hospital Emergency Wards, 76 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 74, 74 (1986)).
3. Id.
4. Note, Cobra'sFangs, supra note 1, at 1186 (citing Himmelstein, Woolhandler,
Harnly, Bader, Silber, Backer & Jones, Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as Social
Triage, 74 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 494, 495 (1984)).
5. Ansell & Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status, inplications, and Policy
Recommendations, 257 J. A.M.A. 1500 (1987).
6. See Note, Cobra'sFangs, supra note 1, at 1186-87. Most evidence points to the
conclusion that the flow of inter-hospital transfers for economic reasons is from forprofit facilities to public, non-profit facilities. Id.
7. Id. at 1189-96.
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that the common law "no duty to treat" rule and the doctrine of
charitable immunity9 were significant factors that operated to form the

foundation of the problem. Present day factors that add to the growth and
severity of patient dumping include increases in the number of
unemployed or otherwise medically indigent persons;' ° increased
Medicaid and Medicare budget cuts in recent years;" the dramatic,
spiraling costs of health care;' a fundamental shift in the health care
industry from nonprofit to for-profit;13 and the general ineffectiveness of
both federal and state programs designed to improve access to health care

for the medically indigent. 14
Section I of this Note will discuss the foundation of patient

dumping - the common law "no duty to treat" rule and the shield of
charitable immunity. Section II will discuss state judicial attempts at
circumventing the harsh results of strict interpretation and application of
the common law. Section III will discuss state legislative attempts to curb

patient dumping; and Section IV will discuss the federal government's
past and present attempts to curb patient dumping and increase access to

health care.

8. McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpretingthe FederalAct Against Patient
Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 182-83 (1989).
9. Rothenberg, Who Cares?:The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency
Care, 26 HOUSTON L. REV. 21, 26-29 (1989).
10. Note, Cobra'sFangs, supra note 1, at 1193. For instance, the number of people
under the age of 65 who had no health insurance increased from 29 million in 1979 to
35 million in 1984. Id. (citing Dowell, Hill-Burton. The Unfidfilled Promise, 12 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 153 (1987)). "When those with inadequate insurance coverage
are added to the number of uninsured, the total number of Americans in danger of being
dumped exceeds 50 million." Id. at 1193, n.55 (citing Dowd, U.S. Health Care Faulted
in Senate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at Al, col. 3).
11. McClurg, supra note 8, at 180.
12. See generally Note, Cobra'sFangs, supra note 1, at 1192-93. Illustrative of the
general rise in the cost of health care are Medicaid statistics which show a coverage rate
of 40% in 1980, versus a Medicaid coverage rate of 70% in 1965. Id. at 1194.
13. See generally id. at 1193; "Private, for-profit hospitals have prospered in the
competitive era," with one large corporation earning over $297 million during 1984.
McClurg, supra note 8, at 181 (citing Kraft, Hospitalsfor Profit: What Price Care, L.A.
Times, Mar. 31, 1985, at 1, col. 4). Contrasting this profit margin with the $7.4 billion
in uncompensated health care spent in 1985 illustrates the obvious burden being placed
on public, not for profit institutions. McClurg, supra note 8, at 182.
14. See generally Note, Cobra's Fangs, supra note 1, at 1193; Ansell & Schiff,
supra note 5, at 1500; McClurg, supra note 8, at 182-83.
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II. THE COMMON LAW AND PATIENT DUMPING

The common law imposes no legal duty upon either hospitals or
physicians to treat patients seeking medical care.' 5 Consequently,. prior
to the middle of the twentieth century the medical community had
virtually no legal incentive to render treatment to those who were unable
to pay. 16 The sole exception to, the harsh results which flowed from
application of the common law "no duty to treat" rule revolved around the
fundamental distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.17
Nonfeasance, or the refusal to provide treatment, could never lead to
liability." Misfeasance, or active misconduct after initiation of treatment
that contributed to the injuries of the plaintiff, could potentially lead to
negligence liability for either hospital or doctor. 9 The misfeasance
exception to the "no duty to treat" rule was applied strictly by courts."
Illustrative of this is Birmingham Hospital v. Crews,2' where the plaintiff
brought his daughter, suffering from diphtheria, to the emergency room
of the defendant hospital.'
The emergency room staff administered
some medical care, but refused to admit the child or continue treatment,
because they feared contagion.'z The child died soon thereafter, and a
negligence claim based on misfeasance was brought.24 Applying the
misfeasance rule strictly, the court denied recovery and created a
distinction between emergency care and in-patient care.' The court held
that "treatment in an emergency" and "full hospital service" were
fundamentally different in terms of duty owed, and liability for
misfeasance could attach only in the case of active misconduct during full
15. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 25.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also McClurg, supra note 8, at 183; W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWENS, THE LAW OF TORTS 56, 373-75 (1984). "Generally, there is no
duty to assist one in peril where the actor has not created the risk." Id.
18. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 25.
19. Id.
20. See generally McClurg, supra note 8, at 182-85.
21. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
22. Id. at 399, 157 So. at 224.
23. Id. at 400, 157 So. at 225 (it is only fair to note that the emergency room staff
in this case, in refusing to admit the child, was following standard hospital procedure).
24. Id., 157 So. at 225.
25. Id. at 398, 157 So. at 224.
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Strict interpretation of the "no duty to treat" rule and

its own implicit exception, as seen in the previous case, created a
significant barrier to effective prosecution of hospitals and physicians by
plaintiffs who were denied or received limited medical assistance. 27 The
"no duty to treat" rule was not, however, a hospital's only means of
escaping liability for nonfeasance or even misfeasance.
Early hospitals in the United States operated as charitable
institutions,' financially dependant to a large degree on philanthropic

donations." As a result, courts were hesitant to pierce the veil of
protection provided by the "no duty to treat" rule without simultaneously
dismantling the firmly entrenched shield of charitable immunity.?0 Until
the middle of the twentieth century, the doctrine of charitable immunity
was viable, widely accepted, and routinely applied, as evidenced by its
adoption in more than forty states. 3' Application of the shield of
charitable immunity can be seen in McDonald v. Massachusetts General
Hospital.2 Relying on Holliday v. St. Leonard's," recovery to a
plaintiff whose leg was found to have been negligently set by a hospital
employee was denied? 4 The denial was based solely on the shield of
charitable immunity, which states that hospitals relying on charitable

donations cannot be required to use those funds for the payment of tort
26. Id. at 400, 157 So. at 225.
27. See Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 25.
28. See generally Waldman, New Regulations for Hill-Burton Hospitals. Can the
Poor Still Afford to See the Doctor?, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1219, 1223 (1987).
29. Id.
30. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 26-29. "Charitable immunity is an exception to the
Id. at 27 (emphasis in
general rule that one is liable for one's own negligence .
original).
31. Id. (citing Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and Their
Continuing Immunity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1384 (1987)).
32. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
33. 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861). Perhaps foreshadowing the eventual demise of the
shield of charitable immunity, Holliday was overturned prior to its use as a convincing
precedent in McDonald. See Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 27. The court in President of
Georgetown College v. Hughes noted: "In this state of the English decisions,
Massachusetts adopted the repudiated rule of Holliday v. St. Leonard in McDonald v.
Massachusetts General Hospital . . . [aipparently . . . [acting] in ignorance of the
English reversal. In any event, they resurrected in America a rule already dead in
England .... ." 130 F.2d 810, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (citations omitted).
34. McDonald, 120 Mass. at 432.
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damages. 35
The doctrine, while widely accepted, was also widely
criticized.' The doctrine came under staunch attack, and by the late
1960's most state courts had abrogated the doctrine through decision and
state legislatures had done the same by statute. 37
III. STATE COURT ATTEMPTS TO COMBAT
PATIENT DUMPING

As detailed above, the "no duty to treat" rule, combined in some
cases with the shield of charitable immunity, created formidable if not
impregnable barriers to plaintiffs seeking recovery based on hospital or
physician negligence. Generally dissatisfied with the results that followed
strict application of the "no duty to treat" rule, state courts began to apply
judicially created theories designed to mitigate the harshness of the
common law in an attempt to render "justice. ' 3 While case law details
these judicial attempts at mitigation, it should be noted that state courts
did not simply disregard the common law; they consciously made attempts
to circumvent it. 31 Judicial creativity was the key ingredient in this
mitigation process, because of the continued acceptance and recognition
of the validity of the "no duty to treat" rule.'
Following the dismantling of the shield of charitable immunity,
early efforts at striking a balance between strict application of the "no
duty to treat" rule and judicial recognition of "justice" focused on a
hospital's duty to act non-negligently after undertaking the care or
treatment of a patient.4 Misfeasance, as found in section 323 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,42 provides that, "one who undertakes,
either gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another, is
subject to liability for harm resulting from a failure to exercise reasonable
"

35. Id. at 436 (citing Holliday v. St. Leonards, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861)).
36. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 28.
37. Id.
38. See generally Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 32-34 (citing O'Neill v. Montefiore
Hospital, 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960); Wilmington
General Hospital v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 17 A.2d 135 (1961); Guerrero v. Copper
Queen Hospital, 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975)).
39. See generally Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 32.
40. See generally Note, Cobra's Fangs, supra note 1, at 1196-97.
41. McClurg, supra note 8, at 185.
42.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
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care, if such failure either increases the risk of harm or harm is suffered
because the other relied upon the undertaking." ' Always recognized as
a potential source for finding physician or hospital liability," the
application of the misfeasance rule was expanded to a significantly more
liberal level of interpretation during the early 1960's.1
Application of this heightened level of misfeasance liability is best
illustrated by O'Neill v. Monteftore Hospital.' In O'Neill, the decedent,
experiencing a heart attack, went to the defendant hospital's emergency
room.' Decedent was refused treatment because the hospital did not
participate in his insurance plan.'" Prior to leaving the hospital however,
an emergency room nurse phoned the decedent's doctor in an attempt to
make alternate arrangements for care. 9 Expressing clear dissatisfaction
with the "no duty to treat" rule, the court sidestepped the issue of a
hospital's duty, or lack thereof, and focused on the misfeasance exception
to the common law.' Examining the emergency room nurse's action,
the appellate division reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's action and held
that plaintiff's proof was prima facie sufficient to permit a jury to make
the reasonable inference that the nurse's phone call constituted an attempt
to administer medical treatment.5'
Although a significant step away from strict interpretation and
application of the "no duty" rule, the O'Neill alternative theory is plagued
by interpretation and application problems. Issues that must be resolved
prior to use by counsel are: when does a hospital begin to render aid, how
much does a hospital have to do before being held to have administered
care, and which hospital personnel, ranging from doctors to orderlies,
must be involved to trigger liability. 52 To date, these issues remain
unanswered.

43. Id.
44. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
45. See Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 32 (comparing O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital,
11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) and Birmingham Hospital
v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934)).
46. 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
47. Id. at 134, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
48. Id., 202 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
49. Id., 202 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
50. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 32 (citing O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11
A.D.2d 132, 135-36, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
51. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 A.D.2d 132, 135-36, 202 N.Y.S.2d 434, 440
(N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
52. See generally Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 38.
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Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove53 involves another
judicially created theory. The parents of a child stricken 'With what was
later diagnosed as bronchial pneumonia brought a wrongful death action
against Wilmington General, alleging that the hospital was negligent in its
failure to provide emergency care.'
The hospital denied any such
liability and stated that the nurse who refused to admit the patient was
properly following hospital procedure. 55 "Procedure" stated that in the
event that a patient is under the care of another physician, the hospital
will not treat such patient.' The Delaware Superior Court, dissatisfied
with the harsh result that would follow strict application of the "no duty
to treat" rule and precedent, fashioned an exception. 57 The "'quasipublic' institution" exception to the common law was based on state
statutory benefits received by the Delaware hospital. 58 These benefits
included tax exemptions, public funding and corporate charters.59 In
return for these benefits, all hospitals, including private institutions, would
have been required by the court, "at all times to render reasonably needed
aid in those instances where an emergency involving death or serious
bodily impairment might reasonably be said to exist." ' 'On appeal, the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the "quasi-public institution"
exception,6 1 but affirmed the order denying the defendant hospital's
motion for summary judgment by creating its own alternate theory.6 2
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis of Manlove by
reiterating the common law rule that a private hospital does not owe the
public a duty to treat every patient appearing at'the 'emergency room.'
Further, the appellate court made very clear 'that the receipt of public
funds or exemptions from state taxation does not create a duty to treat
53. 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961), aff'g Manlove v. Wilmington General
Hospital, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18 (Del Super. Ct. 1961).
54. Id. at 17, 174 A.2d at 136.
55. Id. at 17-18, 174 A.2d at 136-37.
56. Id. at 18, 174 A.2d at 137.
57. Manlove v. Wilmington General Hospital, 53 Del. 338, 343-45, 169 A.2d 18,
20-22 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961) (denial of defendant hospital's motion for summary
judgment).
58. Id. at 343, 169 A.2d at 21.
59. Id. at 343, 169 A.2d at 21.
60. Id. at 345, 169 A.2d at 22.
61. Id. at 343, 169 A.2d at 21.
62. Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 21-25, 174 A.2d 135,
138-40.
63. Id. at 19. 174 A.2d at 137.
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where one previously did not exist." Unable to find adequate legal
support to uphold the "quasi-public institution" theory, yet still dissatisfied
with the result that would result from strict application of the "no duty to
treat" rule, the state supreme court developed a reliance based theory to
justify holding the hospital liable.'
The court found that if a patient
relies on a well established hospital custom of rendering aid in similar
emergency situations, subsequent denial of treatment will have the same
practical effect as that of the hospital denying treatment in the face of a
legal duty.' Because the plaintiff in Manlove had relied, ultimately to
his detriment, on what the court interpreted as a carefully cultivated
reputation developed by the defendant hospital of rendering aid in similar
situations, the hospital may be held liable and the case was remanded for
further proceedings.67 The theory constructed by the appellate
court in Manlove is clearly derived from the reliance theory as it appears
in section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render service to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking, if . . . the harm is
suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.9
In order to be held liable under the Manlove theory, it is necessary that:
"(1) The hospital ... maintain an emergency room; (2) an 'unmistakable
emergency' . . . exists; (3) a well-established custom to render care in
such circumstances . . . be found; and (4) the injured party . . . ha[s]
relied on that custom."'
A closer look at the test implicit in the
64. id. at 19, 174 A.2d at 137.
65. Id. at 25, 174 A.2d at 140. See also Enfield and Sklar, PatientDumping in the
HospitalEmergency Department.-Renewed Interest in an Old Problem, 13 A.J.L.MED.
561, 568-69 (1988).
66. Manlove, 54 Del. at 25, 174 A.2d at 140.
67. Id. at 27, 174 A.2d at 141. See also Rothenberg, supra note 10, at 36.
68. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 36.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 323.
70. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 36 (emphasis in original)(citations omitted).
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Manlove theory reveals the application pitfalls in all but the first prong. 7 '
As to what constitutes an "unmistakable emergency," no definition and no
working criteria can be found in Manlove.' Further, the level of proof
necessary to establish whether the hospital is perceived by the community
as a reliable source of emergency care is also unclear and undefined.'
Finally, proving that a plaintiff actually relied on this custom falls prey
to the difficulties described above as well as countless other proof
problems.74 While problems of application hamper this judicial attempt
at circumventing the common law, the Manlove holding is significant in
that it marked the "first time that a court went beyond the constraints of
both the traditional tort misfeasance-nonfeasance theories and the
requirement of a hospital-patient relationship to find a new basis of
liability. ,,1
Continued attempts at developing a workable alternative to the
common law "no duty to treat" rule led the Arizona Supreme Court to
take another step toward establishing a legal duty for hospitals to provide
care. In Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital,76 the Manlove theory of
detrimental reliance was rejected, and a new theory, similar to the "quasipublic institution" theory espoused by the lower court in Manlove, was
established.'
The plaintiffs in Guerrerowere denied treatment at the defendant
hospital and were forced to travel to another hospital, prolonging both
suffering and recovery. 79 The plaintiff's allegations of detrimental
reliance were based heavily on the Manlove theory,' while the hospital
sought a reaffirmation of the "no duty to treat" rule." Dissatisfied with
both rationales, the Arizona court held that "[t]he character of private
hospitals in Arizona has been changed by statute and regulations" and that

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 36-37.
74. Id.
75. Id.at 36.
76. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975).
77. Id.at 107, 537 P.2d at 1332. See also Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 50-51.
78. See Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 22 Ariz. App. 611, 529 P.2d 1205
(Ariz. Ct. Appls. 1974), vacated, Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital, 112 Ariz. 104,
537 P.2d 1324 (1975).
79. Id.at 611, 529 P.2d at 1205.
80. Guerrero, 112 Ariz. at 104, 537 P.2d at 1330.
81. Id.at 105-06, 537 P.2d at 1330-31.
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Arizona public policy now required a general hospital to maintain
facilities for the provision of emergency care, care that may not be denied
absent cause.' The Arizona theory was based on the presence of state
regulatory, licensing, and operating standards.' The court made clear
that the rationale for imposing a duty to render emergency care was a
logical judicial extension of the legislature's pervasive regulation of
hospitals." The loophole present in the Guerreroholding, that a hospital
could legally deny treatment "with cause," was effectively limited in a
later case, Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital.5
In Thompson, the court set out the only three defenses available
to a hospital charged with failure to render emergency care:86 (1) that
"the hospital is not obligated (or capable) under its state license to provide
the necessary emergency care, (2) there is a valid medical cause to refuse
emergency care, [and] (3) there is no true emergency requiring care and
thus no emergency care which is medically indicated.""
The Arizona theory is more workable on an ad hoc basis than
either Manlove theory, as evidenced by its successful application in
numerous cases.8" The impact of this approach on patient dumping cases
outside Arizona, however, has been negligible."
The most common
explanation for the limited impact of the Arizona theory is that "[i]t
required courts to make the leap from statutes and regulations designating standards for hospital licensing - to a duty treat any and all
persons in need of emergency care, based on broad public policy
concerns. "9
Theories developed by state courts designed to circumvent the "no
duty to treat" rule were generally plagued by application problems. The
unclear reasoning and lack of definitions of key terms led to unsuccessful
use of these alternate theories both within the particular jurisdictions
82. Id. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331.
83. Id. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331.
84. Id. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331.
85. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984).
86. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 52.
87. Thompson, 141 Ariz. at 603, 688 P.2d at 611 (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (1980).
89. Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 53 ("[t]he reason is not completely clear, but may
be due to the fact that Guerrero depended on Arizona statutory policy with little
precedential value elsewhere").
90. Id. at 53 ("[m]orally, the connection is desirable, but legally, it required the
creation of a private cause of action implied from state licensing statutes."). Id.
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involved and outside those jurisdictions. While the application and
definition problems are generally viewed as primarily responsible for the
negligible impact of these mitigation attempts, it is apparent that many
state courts presume that rectifying the patient dumping problem by
creating a legal duty to treat is a legislative task, beyond the parameters
of judicial power.9 1
IV.

STATE LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO COMBATTING

PATIENT DUMPING

In spite of state judicial attempts to alleviate the harsh results of
patient dumping created in large part by the aforementioned "no duty to
treat" rule, the number of patients denied access to emergency medial care
for economic reasons continus to increase. In 1987, experts estimated
that over a quarter of a million patients were transferred for purely
economic reasons.'
These increases have spawned several studies in
recent years. One such study concluded that in a poll of transferred
patients, 97% either lacked insurance or were Medicaid/Medicare
subscribers.' A similar. study of hospital transfers found that 95% of
the trauma patients transferred during a two year period had no insurance
coverage,' and a third such study found that 63% of persons transferred
lacked adequate health insurance. 95
Despite these statistics, representatives of the private health care
sector contend that transfers for economic reasons occur only in isolated
areas and on a limited scale.'. The general public, due primarily to lack
91. See generally Note, Cobra's Fangs, supra note 1, at 1197; Rothenberg, supra
note 9, at 53.
92. Waxman & Dorn, States Take the Lead in Preventing Patient Dumping, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 136 (1988) (citing NAT. ASs'N OF PUB. HosPs., PATIENT
TRANSFERS TO PUBLIC HOSPITALS 45 (1986).
93.

See Note, Cobra Fang's, supra note 1, at 1189-90 (quoting Schiff, Ansell,

Schlosser, ldris, Morrison & Whitman, Transfers to'a Public Hospital - A Prospective
Study of 467 Patients, 314 NEW ENO. J. MED. 552, 556 (1986)).

94. See McClurg, supra note 8, at 177 (citing Reed, Cawley & Anderson, Special
Report. The Effect of a Public Hospital's Transfer Policy on Patient Care, 315 NEW

ENO. J. MED. 1428, 1431 (1986)).
i
95. Id. (citing Himmelstein, Woolhandler, Harnly, Bader, Silber, Backer & Jones,
Patient Transfers:Medical Practiceas Social Triage, 74 AM. J.PUB. HEALTH 494, 495
(1984)).
96. Ansell & Schiff, supra note 5, at 1500 (these representatives "contend that case
reports of patient dumping are, anecdotal and represent rare isolated incidents.").
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of information, is similarly misdirected in its understanding of the
magnitude of the patient dumping problem. Nevertheless, despite general
ignorance of the severity of this problem, over one-half of the states have
presently enacted statutes designed to ensure indigent access to emergency
medical care and to reduce the number of patients transferred for
economic reasons. 7
Nevertheless, few of these statutes are adequately written so as to
fulfill their objectives. This is best understood by comparing two general
categories of patient dumping legislation illustrated by the California98
and New York statutes." California's statute exemplifies the "cutting
edge" of state patient dumping legislation, while New York's is
representative of those that fail to achieve what is intended.
Effective January 12, 1988, California Health and Safety Code
section 1317 represents an example of the most comprehensive state
legislation aimed at patient dumping to date.1 " The statute prescribes
indigent access to emergency medical care, 10 1 addresses patient
dumping,"° and sets up a scheme for the reimbursement of
uncompensated care.IW In California, any hospital with an emergency
room is required to provide screening and treatment if necessary "to
relieve or eliminate the emergency medical condition.""
Hospitals
may not inquire about the patient's insurance coverage or ability to pay
prior to the provision of proper treatment. 0 5 Furthermore, they cannot
inquire into the patient's "race, citizenship, ethnicity, religion, national
origin, age, sex, preexisting medical condition or physical or mental
97. See generally Dowell, Indigent Access to Hospital Emergency Room Service,
18 CLEARINOHOUSE REV. 483, 493-99 (1984)(state-by-state summary of emergency care
legislation and/or case law); McClurg, supra note 8, at 190 (state statutory remedies for
patients unlawfully dumped).
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1317-1317.2 (West Supp. 1988).

99. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b.1-5 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
100. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317-1317.2(a) def. of emergency

med. condition with lack of definition in N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b.
101. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (a), (d)(a) "Emergency services
and care shall be provided to any person requesting the services or care, or for whom
services or care is requested, for any health facility . . . that maintains . . . an
emergency department to provide emergency services to the public when the health
facility has appropriate facilities and qualified personnel." Id.
102. See id. at § 1317(a)-(d).
103. See generally id. at § 1797.98(a).
104. Id. at § 1317.1(a)
105. Id. at § 1317(d).
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handicap. "1
The statute makes clear that these restrictions and
regulations apply to both physicians and hospitals."0 7
In the event that the hospital denies treatment, the hospital must
give written and oral notice to the patient or patient's family. 0 " The
notice must include a clear statement of the patient's right to receive
emergency care.' °9 Furthermore, notice including a similar statement
of patient's rights must be posted in all emergency rooms." 0 However,
a hospital may still deny treatment if reasonable care was used in
determining either that the patient was not suffering an emergency or that
the hospital was not equipped to treat the problem at hand."' Strict
procedures must be followed by hospitals making or receiving transfers,
and detailed records of these transfers must be kept on file with the
state. 2 In the event that a hospital properly decides to transfer a
patient, they must make arrangements for the receiving hospital to provide
proper care. "13
Most significantly, the California statute erects a system of inner
checks and balances to safeguard implementation of regulations. Hospital
personnel who learn of violations must report them to the California
Department of Health Services." 4 Local emergency service agents may
also refer violations to the district attorney for prosecution." 5 In
conjunction with these safeguards, a detailed scheme of civil fines
(applicable to both hospitals and physicians), damages, injunctive relief,
and attorneys fees for patients and hospitals wronged by violations is
available." 6
And finally, the California statute details a system
designed to allocate certain percentages of funds taken from traffic fines
in order to compensate doctors and hospitals who provide care to the
indigent." 7

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at § 1317(b).
See generally id. at § 1317.6(c). See also supra, note 103.
Id. at § 1317.3(d).
Id.
Id.
Id.at § 1317(c).

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See §§ 1317.2-4.
Id.at § 1317.2(a)-(c).
Id.at § 1317.4.
Id.at § 1317.5(a)-(b).
Id.at § 1317.6.
Id.at § 1797.98(a).
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While the New York statute118 is not nearly as innovative as the
California law, it is typical of state legislative attempts nationwide.11 9
New York Public Health Law section 2805-b(1) provides that "[e]very
general hospital shall admit any person who is in need of immediate
hospitalization . . .and shall not before admission question the patient.
Further,
. . concerning insurance, credit, or payment of charges."'"
any
patient
to
another
hospital
or
"[n]o general hospital shall transfer
health care facility on the grounds that the patient is unable to pay or
Similarly, general
guarantee payment for services rendered." '
hospitals that maintain facilities providing out-patient emergency care must
provide care to any person who requires it. 'I
On its face, the New York statute is similar" 2 to the California
legislation. However, any similarity ends there, for the New York statute
is grossly inadequate in many areas; definitions of vital terms are either
completely non-existent or imprecise.
Further, the New York statute
lacks notice requirements, a crucial element in patient dumping
legislation, because most people are unaware of their rights to medical
care." z Similarly, and in contrast to the California statute, New York
does not provide adequate penalty provisions. " The maximum fine for
hospitals found to have transferred patients in contravention of the statute
Large private corporate hospital
is one thousand dollars. 27
organizations will not be deterred by such an insignificant fine. Finally,
the New York statute does not provide a civil damage remedy28or a private
right of action for those harmed by physicians or hospitals.
118. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b (McKinney Supp. 1989).
119. See generally McClurg, supra note 8, at 190-97 ("[these] statutes may
supplement or largely supplant the common law principles discussed above").
120. N.Y. PuB HEALTH LAW § 2805-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
121. Id.
122. id.
123. Id. at §§ 2805-b(1) to (5).
124. For instance, the operative term "emergency" is not defined in the New York
statute. Compare id. at § 2805 with CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1317.2, 1317.3,
1317.4 (West Supp. 1988).
125. Compare N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1317.3 (d); see also Ansell & Schiff, supra note 5, at 1501.
126. Compare NEW YORK PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b(2)(b) with CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 1317.4 (proceedings to impose fine) and § 1317.6 (penalties).
127. See NEW YoRK PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b(2)(b).
128. Compare NEW YoRK PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-b(2)(b) with CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 1317.6(J).
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V. FEDERAL ATrEMPTS TO CURB PATIENT DUMPING

A. The Hill-Burton Act

During the first few years of the twentieth century, doctors began
treating patients in newly constructed hospitals rather than in their
homes. 129
Funding for these hospitals came primarily from
philanthropic organizations. "
Physician and hospital fees were
generally paid in full by the patient following treatment.' 3 ' During the
Depression, the infrastructure of the typical hospital began to
crumble.' 32 Large donations from the wealthy all but vanished, as did
cash payment for treatment." 3 Unable to cope with the financial
pressures, many hospitals were forced to close their doors." By the
end of World War II, the United States was faced with a crisis - severe
shortages of hospital beds combined with a health care delivery system
underdeveloped as a result of a decade of economic depression. 35
'
With passage of the Hospital Survey -and Construction Act of
1946,13 generally referred to as the Hill-Burton Act, 37 the face of the
hospital system in the United States changed. The federal government
began its entry into what had previously been a wholly private industry.
Generally, the Hill-Burton Act provided federal funds for the construction
129. See Waldman, supra note 28, at 1223 (quoting HEALTH POLITICS AND POLICY
78 (Litman & Robbins eds., 1984)). Advances in anesthesia and anti-infection
procedures were two primary factors in the rise of in-hospital care. Id. at 1223 n.30.
130. Id. at 1223.
131. Id. It should be noted that during the first several decades of the twentieth
century, sophisticated health insurance plans were virtually non-existent. However, due
in large part to a burgeoning pre-Depression economy, many people were financially
able to pay for medical services without such assistance. Id.
132. Id. at 1223-24 (due in large part to the crumbling Depression era economy,
philanthropic donations were drastically reduced; patients were no longer able to pay for
medical services, and over 800 hospitals, unable to offset costs between 1928 and 1938,
were closed (citing Note, The Hill-Burton Act 1946-1980. Asynchrony in the Delivery of
Health Care to the Poor, 39 M.D.L. REV. 316, 318-19 (1979))).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1224.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1982 & Supp 111984).
137. Senators Hill and Burton were largely responsible for the introduction of the
legislation in 1945, hence the common name. Waldman, supra note 28 at 1224.
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and modernization of existing public and private nonprofit health care
facilities.'
Combined with a sharp increase in private investment,
more than five billion dollars in grants, loans, and loan guarantees placed
the hospital and health care delivery industry back on its feet.'39
In the context of patient dumping and indigent access to
emergency medical care, the most important feature of the Hill-Burton
Act was the contingency placed on eligibility to receive funds." 4°
"[Aipproval of an application, available only to public or nonprofit
hospitals, was contingent upon receipt of the facility's assurances to
provide an appropriate level of uncompensated care. " 4
The Act
required hospitals receiving funds to make their emergency services
available for a period of twenty years to all persons residing in the area
of the facility."4 2 While not part of the original intent of its drafters, by
the time the Act was passed the community service obligation was
strongly supported. 43
In retrospect, the Hill-Burton Act has been only a partial success.
It revived a troubled industry, but has had an extremely limited impact on
the assurance of emergency medical care to the indigent. There are
several reasons that can be highlighted to illustrate why the Act has failed
in this respect. First, the operative term "emergency" is not defined
anywhere in the Act.'" Second, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), which is responsible for monitoring the Act's
implementation, has deferred this function to state agencies designed to
138. Id. at 1227 (citing Wing, The Community Service Obligation of Hill-Burton
Health Facilities, 23 B.C.L. REV. 577, 577-78, n.6 (1984)). Specifically, the HillBurton Act is responsible for over 40% of today's existing acute care hospital beds. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. "The four criteria for eligibility (for federal funds) were: (1) the facility's
financial status, (2) the nature of the services provided by the facility, (3) the area's need
for free and below cost care and (4) the facility's cooperation with other facilities to
provide charity care." Id. (citing Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor
Under the Hill-Burton Act: Realities and Pitfalls, 70 N.W.U.L. REV. 168, 189 (1975).
141. Id.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(l)-(2).
143. See Waldman, supra note 28, at 1228-29. Both John Muir Mem. Hosp., Inc.
v. Davis, 726 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1984) and Wyoming Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris,
727 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1984) have affirmed that the community care obligations
imposed on fund recipients were clearly supported during passage of Hill-Burton.
144. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1. The result of this failure is that hospitals are
free to set their own standards for what constitutes an emergency. By interpreting the
term strictly, hospitals can effectively reduce the number of patients they are under a
duty to treat. See also Note, Cobra's Fangs, supra note 1, at 1199.
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regulate fund disbursement and compliance with the community care
obligations." s However, HHS has failed to supply those agencies with
guidelines under which to operate.'
The result is that prior to 1970,
no state actively monitored hospital compliance, allowing health care
facilities to completely disregard their obligations."t 7 Lastly, the HillBurton Act does not provide a private right of action for compensatory or
punitive damages for plaintiffs alleging that hospitals have failed to
provide care as outlined by the Act." Evidence of the gross failure to
comply with community care obligations in return for federal aid is
staggering, especially in light of the fact that almost half of the acute care
49
hospital beds in this nation are products of Hill-Burton funds. 1
In 1985, HHS proposed two sets of regulations which could have
the effect of further reducing or eliminating community care obligations
owed by hospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds." 5 To date, both sets of
regulations have become effective, and while the new provisions do not
encompass a great number of hospitals, they do add to the number of
hospitals increasingly unwilling to bear the burden of uncompensated
5

care. 1

The first set of regulations, commonly referred to as the March
regulations, are a reflection of the changes approved by Congress in the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.152 "Upon the transfer of ownership or
upon leasing to an entity ineligible to receive Hill-Burton funds, a hospital
owing Hill-Burton obligations must inform HHS of the change in
management."' 53 Following this notification to HHS, three options
145. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 291c, 2911-291m; Waldman, supra note 28, at 1227.
146. Note, Cobra's Fangs, supra note 1, at 1198.
147. Id. at 1199-1200. The failure of HHS to erect a monitoring system at either
the state or federal level has been a major factor in the Act's partial failure. However,
in 1979, HHS did promulgate some regulation directed at states - they had little or no
effect in the past decade. Id.
148. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(1).
149. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
150. See generally Waldman, supra note 28, at 1232-36 (March Regulations: Pub.
L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 1112 (1984)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291c-f,
i, 300s-la, 300t-12 (1982 & Supp. 1991)). (Sept. Regulations: 51 Fed. Reg. 33,208
(1986)(codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 124, 124.501, .502, .510, .511, .513 (1990)).
151. Waldman, supra note 28, at 1233.
152. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 124.704.
153. 42 C.F.R. § 124.704(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(i) A facility "ceases to be" a facility
for which a grant could have been made under
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arise: (1) either the government may receive the value of the facility's
cost of modernization or construction at the time of the transfer multiplied
by the ratio of the federal subsidy to the project cost itself or, (2) the new
owner may apply for a waiver of the community care obligation and then
set up a trust to fund, for a limited time, care to the indigent, or (3) a
complete waiver may be requested if there is strong evidence that another
facility in the immediate geographical area is better suited to provide the
care. 15
The lump sum payment system inherent in the March
regulations is a perfect accompaniment to the profit maximization
rationale of most for-profit hospital corporations. 155 Once the lump sum
is paid (option 1) or runs out (option 2) all obligations under Hill-Burton
are complete."1 Critics argue that there are no assurances that hospitals
will continue to provide uncompensated care after the lump sum is paid
or runs out. 157

The second set, the September regulations, provide that a facility
which receives at least ten percent of its operating funds from state or
local government may qualify as a public facility. 58 Thereafter, the
newly created public facility is exempt from keeping records of the
uncompensated care it administers.' 59 Over 53% of all Hill-Burton
hospitals would qualify for this exemption."w Again, it is argued that
under this regulation, hospitals will no longer be compelled to provide
the statute pursuant to which the grant was
awarded when it is not longer operated as such
a facility; and
(ii) A facility "ceases to be a public or
non-profit facility "when an entry that is not a
public or other non-profit corporation or
association assumes management responsibilities
with respect to the facility which, in the
Secretary's judgment, are so pervasive as to
constitute operation of the facility....
154. See Waldman, supra note 28, at 1233-34.
155. See generally id.at 1235.
156. Id.

157. Id.
158. 42 C.F.R. § 124.513(b)(3)(i) (10% funding figure is exclusive of all
compensation received as reimbursements for Medicare and Medicaid recipients).
159. Id. A hospital may also demonstrate that they have provided twice the amount
of uncompensated care over the last three years to receive the record-keeping exemption.
Id.
160. Waldman, supra note 28, at 1236.
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care to the needy.1 61 Furthermore, absent records which detail the
amount of uncompensated care delivered by a given facility, it will
become impossible to monitor compliance.162
Experts conclude that both sets of regulations subvert the
legislative intent of the statute. 1' The practical effect of the regulations
is that hospitals are eligible to receive vast sums of federal money in
return for promises of uncompensated care that go largely ignored and
completely unenforced. Further, the regulations support the premise that
hospitals can negotiate with HHS when receiving funds - negotiations
designed to increase profits, inevitably at the expense of the medically
indigent.'"
B. COBRA
In 1985 Congress passed section 9121 of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act." The clear and overriding intent
of a bi-partisan coalition of congressional supporters in enacting this
legislation was to halt the ever-increasing trend of hospitals denying
emergency medical services to patients because of their inability to
pay. 1" Section 9121, commonly referred to as COBRA, creates a
statutory duty for hospitals to provide stabilizing treatment to any person
with an emergency medical condition.167 To achieve this end, COBRA
places strict limits and regulations on the transfer of patients from one
hospital capable of providing care to another based on economic
considerations." COBRA's anti-dumping provisions represent the most
comprehensive federal attempt to date at ensuring access to stabilizing
emergency medical care for those who cannot afford it.
COBRA requires that all hospitals that participate in the Medicare
program and operate an emergency department must provide a medical
161. Id.
162. See generally id. at 1236-40.
163. Id. at 1237.
164. See generally id. at 1238.
165. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164-167 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. IV 1986)).
166. See McClurg, supra note 8, at 197-99.
167. Id.; see also Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 60.
168. See generally Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 61.
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examination to any person requesting one." The examination, defined
in accordance with the title of the Act," 7° is designed to determine
whether a patient is suffering from an "emergency medical condition" or
is in "active labor." 17 ' Under the Act, an emergency medical condition
is defined as one that
manifest[s] itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected
to result in placing the patient's health in serious
jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or
serious dysfunctions of any bodily organ or part."l
Active labor is defined as
[the] time at which delivery is imminent; there is
inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital
prior to delivery; or a transfer may pose a threat to the
health and safety of the patient or the unborn child.' 73
If a patient meets the criteria as outlined in the definitional sections of the
Act, the hospital must provide stabilizing treatment or transfer in
accordance with appropriate procedures and safeguards. 74 Following
the initial mandatory medical screening, a doctor may determine that the
benefit the patient will receive if transferred to another facility will
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
The law protects all persons who come to an
emergency room, whether or not such persons
are eligible for Medicare benefits. All persons
who show up at the emergency door must be
treated alike, whether or not they are insured.
This duty is not conditioned on any guarantee of
government reimbursement. (citation omitted)
(emphasis in original).
170. The title is Examination and Treatmentfor Emergency Medical Conditions and
Women in Labor.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
172. Id. at § 1395dd(e)(1).
173. Id. § 1395dd(e)(2).
174. Id. at § 1395dd(e)(2).
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outweigh the risk involved in the transfer.' 75 This may occur if one
hospital is not properly equipped to deal with the particular medical
emergency at hand. 76 Should this situation arise, the transferring
doctor must certify this conclusion in writing."m While at first blush
this transfer provision may appear to provide hospitals and doctors with
another loophole through which indigent access can continue to be
hindered, it was designed to protect patient interests by allowing hospitals
to evaluate emergency situations considering not only COBRA liability but
also the best interests of the patient. 78 Without this provision, which
in no manner whatsoever reduces a hospital's duty to provide stabilizing
care, facilities lacking proper equipment or personnel to treat a specific
emergency would nevertheless be forced to administer treatment in order
to avoid liability, regardless of the adequacy of the treatment.' 79
The provisions of the Act which regulate the transfer of indigent
patients suffering from emergency medical conditions or active labor prior
to stabilization impose upon hospitals and doctors far-reaching duties.
Included among the strict procedures for transfers under COBRA are
regulations designed to monitor not only the transferring facility, but the
receiving facility."W First, the receiving facility must agree to accept
and treat the patient, a condition based in part on the availability of beds
and necessary qualified personnel.'' When a transfer is effectuated, the
transferring facility is under a duty to provide the receiving hospital with
all medical records concerning the transferred patient.8 2 Further, the
transfer must be carried out with medically necessary personnel and
175. Id. § at 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii). It should be noted that COBRA covers all patient
movements, not merely the traditional inter-hospital transfer. Id. at § 1395dd(e)(5).
Inter-hospital movements of patients that are not in accordance with the Act may be
considered dumping. Id. Further, delays in rendering treatment may also be considered
dumping. Id. at § 1395dd(b)(1).
176. Id. at § 1395dd(c)(2).
177. Id.; see also Rothenberg, supra note 9, at 61 n.299.
178. See Enfield & Sklar, supra note 65, at 582.
179. See id.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2). It should be noted that hospitals may transfer a
patient without risking liability when the patient or her representatives request a transfer.
Id. at § 1395dd(c)(1).
181. Id. at § 1395dd(c)(2).
182. Id.
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equipment, to ensure the patient's"safety during the actual transfer.' 3
The Act contains both enforcement and remedy provisions for
instances where obligations and duties are either not fully met or
completely disregarded.'"
The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), specifically the HHS Secretary, are designated
monitoring agents.1' 5 Some commentators believe that HHS' role
ideally should be to implement the Act and to measure compliance,
investigating violations and issuing sanctions where warranted.'" A
precursor to HHS investigation is a medical facility's knowing, willing,
or negligent failure to meet the statutory requirements of COBRA.'"
In the event the Secretary's investigation uncovers a violation, both
hospital and physician are potentially subject to sanctions."'
Specifically, a hospital found to have violated the Act is subject to
suspension or termination of its Medicare contract. 8 9 Further, civil
penalties of up to $25,000 per violation can be levied against hospitals and
responsible physicians who knowingly violate the Act."o
Perhaps the most significant aspect., of COBRA, from an
enforcement perspective, is the provision which allows an individual who
has suffered harm as a result of a violation of the Act to pursue a private
cause of action to recover "those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the state in which the hospital is located."' 9' And
finally, COBRA's remedial provisions extend to medical facilities that
have suffered financial loss as a direct result of another hospital's
unlawful transfer of patients. 11
In the. face of these, thorough and, far-reaching remedial
183. Id. In the event that a hospital has properly determined that a transfer is
warranted pursuant to the strict restrictions, and the patient refuses to agree to such
transfer, the hospital is deemed to have.administered stabilizing treatment and thereafter
relieved of COBRA liability. See Enfield. & Sklar, supra note 65, at 583.
184. See generally Note, Cobra's Fangs, supra note 1, at 1217-21.
185. See 42 U.S.C. §, 1395 dd(a).
186. Note, Cobra's Fangs, supra note 1, at 1219.
187. Id. at § 1395dd(d)(1).
188. id. at § 1395dd(d)(2).
189. Id. at § 1395dd(d)(1).
190. Id. The term "responsible physician" encompasses all physicians employed
or under contract with the hospital in question. Id. at § 1395dd(d)(2).
191. Id. at § 1395dd(d)(3)(A).
192. Id. at § 1395dd(d)(3)(B). By showing that an improper transfer occurred, any
hospital that receives such a transfer can obtain damages or appropriate equitable relief
under the laws of the state in which the hospital is located. Id. § 1395dd(d)(3)(B).
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provisions, HHS enforcement of COBRA has been lax."m As a direct
result, the importance of utilizing the private right of action created by
COBRA increases dramatically.'" Without the benefit of Supreme
Court precedent, several federal district courts have begun to fashion a
framework within which a plaintiff: under COBRA must operate."
Each case that will be discussed below involves the foundation of COBRA
claims, jurisdiction, pleadings, and damages.
1. Jurisdiction. - Section 1395dd(d)(3)(A) provides that a
plaintiff who has suffered harm as a direct result of a violation of the Act
may recover damages in a civil action against the health care facility."
However, the Act does not state in which forum, state or federal, a
plaintiff may bring this private action.1 97 Nevertheless, a firm body of
case law has developed, supporting early contentions that federal
jurisdiction is available to plaintiffs. 198
Bryant v. Riddle Memorial Hospital 99 was the first case in
which a federal court determined that COBRA provided for a private
cause of action in federal court." Through an extensive examination of
the legislative history pertinent to this issue, the, Bryant court determined
that it was indeed the intent of Congress to allow a private COBRA action
to be brought in federal court." Focusing on committee reports, the
court observed that the Ways and Means Committee stated the following:
"Any persons or entity adversely and directly affected by a participating
hospital's violation of these requirements may bring an action, in an
appropriate state or Federal district court, for damages to the person
arising from the violation." ' , The Bryant court's initial determination
that federal courts may hear private COBRA claims has been routinely
193. See McClurg, supra note 8, at 200. "Despite estimates of 250,000 dumped
patients per year, as of January 1, 1988, the Department of.Health and Human Services
(HHS) had imposed monetary penalties against only two hospitals and never had
suspended a hospital from Medicare participation." Id. (citations omitted).
194. See generally Rothenberg, supra note9, at 67-69.
195. See infra notes 196-223 and accompanying text.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(A).
197. See Bryant v. Riddle Memorial Hospital, 689 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
198. See infra notes 201-207 and accompanying text.'199. 689 F. Supp 490 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
200. Id. at 493.
201. Id. at 492-93 (citations omitted).
202. id. at 492 (citations omitted).
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followed in subsequent cases. In particular, Sorrells v. Babcock' not
only followed the Bryant rationale, but went further and held that federal
courts could exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a plaintiff's pending state
law claims for medical malpractice, reasoning that both claims arose out
of a common nucleus of facts.' The consensus thus far is that federal
district courts are available to plaintiffs seeking to assert a private cause
of action under COBRA.m
2. Pleadings. - Because COBRA plaintiffs generally tread
where no plaintiff has previously been, pleading a violation of the
statutory duties proscribed by the Act can be troublesome. Motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim are a common defense tactic.'
Several cases can be analyzed to detail the necessary elements each cause
of action must allege in order for a COBRA plaintiff to avoid
dismissal.20
In Deberry v. Sherman,20 8 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
hospital discharged her child prior to stabilization, thereby violating
COBRA.2 The hospital moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.21 Specifically, the hospital asserted
that the plaintiff's COBRA cause of action was nothing more than a state
malpractice claim of misdiagnosis."' The court, after examining the
facts and setting forth the applicable law on stating a claim, established
a framework within which COBRA plaintiffs should operate so as to
effectively state a cause of action.21 2
203. 733 F. Supp 1189 (N.D. I11. 1990).
204. Id. at 1191-92.
205. See generally Bryant, 689 F. Supp. at 492-93; Sorrells, 733 F. Supp. at 119192; Thompson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8, 9 (N.D. 111.1989).
206. See Thompson, 716 F. Supp. at 8; Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Assoc., 741 F.
Supp. 1302 (N.D. 111.1990).
207. See e.g., Deberry v. Sherman, 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. I11. 1990); Stewart
v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990); Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727
F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
208. 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. I11.1990).
209. Id. at 1303. Plaintiff took her daughter to defendant emergency room "with
a fever, rash, stiff neck with her head tilted to the left, and dispositional aberrations
including irritability and lethargy." Although the plaintiff's daughter was tested, two days
later the daughter had worsened and was eventually diagnosed as suffering from spinal
meningitis which caused deafness. Id:
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1303-05.
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[W]e conclude that the would-be COBRA plaintiff must
allege that he (1) went to the defendant's emergency
room (2) with an emergency medical condition, and that
the hospital either (3) did not adequately screen him to
determine whether he had such a condition, or (4)
discharged or transferred him before the emergency
condition had been stabilized. 2" 3
As long as "the basic facts have been alleged . . . this is sufficient for
purposes of Rule 8(a)." 21
When pleading a COBRA violation, plaintiffs and their attorneys
must take care to analyze the facts of the alleged misconduct to be certain
that the circumstances do not allege a cause of action based on state
medical malpractice law. 215 A clear majority of the federal courts that
have had the opportunity to examine pleadings which intentionally or
unintentionally cloak malpractice claims in the form of COBRA violations
have refused to exercise jurisdiction.2 6 Further, COBRA plaintiffs
must, at some point, assert that the alleged misconduct was the result of
a denial of medical services based on a lack of insurance or money.217
The rationale behind each of these pleading requirements is similar, and
is based on judicial interpretation of the legislative intent behind
218
COBRA.
First, as a general rule, misdiagnosis and resultant harm do not,
standing alone, constitute a violation of COBRA.219 For instance, in
Stewart v. Myrick,' the plaintiff alleged a violation of COBRA
revolving around the failure of the defendant emergency room physician
to diagnose what later turned out to be heart disease with unstable angina
By examining the
pectoris, an emergency medical condition. t
213. Id. at 1305.
214. Id. (citing F.R. Civ. P. 8(a)).
215. See Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990) (depiction of the
result of mispleading a state medical malpractice claim as a COBRA violation).
216. See, e.g., id. at 436; Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495
(S.D. Ind. 1989).
217. Stewart, 731 F. Supp. at 434-36.
218. See supra notes 167-70.
219. See, e.g., Stewart, 731 F. Supp. at 434-36. Rather, the misdiagnosis is
challengeable under traditional medical malpractice precepts, in state court.
220. 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990).
221. Id. at 434.
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legislative history of the Act, the Stewart court concluded that Congress
intended to create a cause of action under COBRA based on denials of
Because it was uncontroverted
medical care for economic reasons.'
that Stewart was never denied treatment or discharged due to a lack of
insurance,' the case represented a traditional claim for malpractice, not
dumping.2
Citing a similar case, Evin v. University Heights
Hospital,' with approval, the Stewart court stated:
The plaintiff's interpretation reaches beyond the purpose
of the statute, which is specifically directed toward
preventing prospective patients from being turned away
for economic reasons. Underlying plaintiff's reading of
the Act is her implicit complaint that she was
misdiagnosed. . . . This complaint, rather than focusing
on the "dumping" problem, begins by attacking the
doctors provisional diagnosis.
Claims regarding
diagnosis ... lie in the area of medical malpractice...
226

Clearly, federal courts are reluctant to extend COBRA beyond what they
have determined are its legislatively designed parameters. To avoid this
litigation pitfall, plaintiffs should exercise care in their pleadings, resisting
the desire to tie misdiagnosis in with the anti-dumping proscriptions of
COBRA.
3. Damages. - As stated previously, the damage provisions of
COBRA, which relate specifically to private causes of action asserted by
individual plaintiffs, do not preempt state law. 27 It is clear from the
reported cases that federal courts are interpreting and applying this part
of the Act strictly, limiting damages recoverable to those available under
state law.?
222. Id. at 434-36.
223. id. at 434.
224. Id. at 436.
225. 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
226. Stewart, 731 F. Supp. 436 (citing Evitt, 727 F. Supp. at 497).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(a).
228. See, e.g., Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hospital, Inc., 709 F.
Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Maziarka v. St. Elizabeth Hospital, No. 88 Civ. 6658
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1989). On its face, this failure to preempt state law may seem
harmless, but this changes when it is understood that traditionally, state laws have not
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In Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hospital, Inc. ,'
the district court was faced with interpreting COBRA in light of state laws
that had the effect of capping damages available under malpractice
statutes. 0 The court found that the intent behind COBRA's remedial
provisions was to defer to these limitations, which had the effect of
reducing the amount of damages awarded. 3' Similarly, in Maziarka v.
3
St. Elizabeth Hospital,'
the court held that the unavailability of a
punitive damage award under state medical malpractice law carried over
to the adjudication of COBRA remedies, and effectively denied punitive
damages to COBRA plaintiffs in that jurisdiction. "
Plaintiffs and their attorneys should remain aware of the potential
for lower recoveries than may have been anticipated. Further, attorneys
must be versed in the applicable state medical malpractice laws of the
particular jurisdiction in order to best serve the interests of their clients.
VI. CONCLUSION

The United States is a nation of unrivaled strength, wealth, and
opportunity. It is therefore both puzzling and disturbing to realize the
magnitude of the problem of patient dumping in America. It is
unconscionable that large segments of the population are either completely
denied access to emergency medical care or left to suffer in overburdened
facilities, which, for purely economic reasons, are saturated with patients.
While it is quite clear that patient dumping developed concurrently with
the modern health care delivery system,' it is not at all clear why this
was permitted to occur. But, the reality is that, each year, hundreds of
thousands of people are denied access to emergency medical care for
economic reasons. This nation needs to find a manageable and effective
means of stopping this unfortunate trend.
The most recent federal attempt to curb patient dumping, as well

been cognizant of the damages suffered by the denial of access to emergency medical
care. The result of these combined factors is that punitive damages may not be
recoverable, or caps may be placed on damage awards.
229. 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
230. Id.
231. id. at 855.
232. No. 88 Civ. 6658 (N.D. 111.Feb. 15, 1989).
233. Id.
234. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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as several state attempts,235 provide the modern foundation from which
this nation can begin to achieve emergency medical care for all. The
statutory duty to provide such care created in COBRA and similar state
equivalents, forces both hospitals and physicians to administer emergency
care to any individual in need, regardless of his or her ability to pay.'
However, the fundamental change that has taken place in the hospital
industry, from non-profit to for-profit, sharply conflicts, at all levels, with
these newly created statutory duties. The modern health care delivery
system is increasingly a slave to the demand for profits, a quest that
inevitably detracts from the provision of uncompensated care to those who
are ill and unable to pay for medical services.
It is of vital importance that COBRA and the state statutory
schemes dealing with patient dumping act in concert with, and not in
conflict with, other state and federal laws. Consequently, valid attempts
should be made to rectify the imprecisions in COBRA language.
"Medical Screening" must be defined so that hospitals and physicians are
not presented with potential loopholes. Further, the limits inherent in
state law damage provisions available to plaintiffs suing under COBRA
should be removed, so that hospitals and physicians who have ignored
their duty to provide care can be sanctioned appropriately. Finally, a
combined federal, state, and general public effort is of paramount
importance in combatting patient. dumping, due in large part to the
decades of hostile precedent as well as the general ignorance surrounding
the social horror of large segments of our population being unable to
receive necessary emergency medical care due to their economic status.
ChristopherJ. Field
235. McClurg, supra note 8, at 182.
236. Ansell & Schiff, supra note 5,at 1501.

